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Abstract 
The theory of tax competition suggests that different tools might be used to attract physical 
capital and taxable profits. While it is assumed that FDI in real activity is deterred by high 
effective taxes, investment undertaken for purpose of profit-shifting is deterred by a higher 
statutory tax rate. Using information from the RWI-Database "Globalisation", which contains 
statistics about foreign engagements of the most important German enterprises, this paper 
investigates if this assumption holds in reality. Differentiating between the functional form of 
engagement and using a linear regression, the analysis provides evidence that FDI in real 
activity (production) is correlated with effective tax rates while FDI that implies more 
opportunities for profit shifting activities (service, finance and R&D) is correlated with the 
statutory tax rate. 
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I. Introduction 
The implementation of a single European Market and increasing tax competition has created a 
number of problems for fiscal authorities in the European Union during the last years. When 
we think of corporate taxation there are two issues which are particularly interesting. One is 
the possibility to attract foreign direct investment in the form of physical capital, creating 
positive spill-over effects to the local economy such as increased demand for labour. The 
other one is profit shifting, mostly affecting tax revenues. The second issue is of major 
concern for tax authorities in typical high tax countries such as Germany: while corporate tax 
revenues grew in most countries of the EU and stayed constant in the OECD average in the 
first half of the 1990s (see Table 1), they declined from 0.96 percent of GDP to 0.57 percent 
of GDP in Germany, which equals a decrease of 40 percent. A considerable proportion of this 
decline stems from the behaviour of large multinational firms, which have, even though they 
work very profitable, ceased to pay corporate taxes at home. Several examples of such 
behaviour can be found: from 1994 to 1995 Commerzbank doubled its profits and 
simultaneously halved its tax load. At the same time Siemens made 1.3 Billion Euro profits 
which where fully exempted from taxation in Germany1.  
 
This problem is certainly not confined to German corporations, but the German case is more 
obvious than that of any other country. A recent global survey performed by the consulting 
firm Ernst&Young (2001) supports this hypothesis. According to this study, transfer pricing 
and profit shifting are the most important future international tax issues for multinational 
corporations (61%), followed by double taxation relief and foreign tax credits (10% and 
13%). While profit shifting is presently part of the corporate strategic planning process for 
approximately one third of all responding corporations, it is important for more than half of 
the German firms. More detailed insights in multinationals tax planning come from the 
Ruding Committee. Already in 1992, the committee asked businesses within the European 
Union, to which degree their location decisions are tax driven. The general result was that 
taxes play an important role in the decision making process of firms. Moreover, this survey 
revealed that while taxes appear to be a key factor in decisions where to locate real productive 
activity, they appear to be even more important in the decision where to locate financial 
service centres2; a clear sign for profit shifting. 
                                                 
1 More examples are given by Weichenrieder (1996).  
2 More information can be found in Ruding Report (1992) and Devereux (1992). 
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Table 1 
Corporate tax revenues in percent of GDP 
 1990 1996 Percentage change 
Belgium 2.53 2.63 + 3.97 
France 2.33 2.09a - 10.18 
Germany 0.96 0.57 - 39.93 
Ireland 1.88 2.98b + 58.56 
Netherlands 3.36 4.16 + 23.72 
United Kingdom 4.02 4.27a + 6.27 
United States 1.63 2.25 + 37.71 
OECD average 2.57 2.49 - 3.14 
 
a Values for France and the United Kingdom belong to the year 1997. 
b The value for Ireland comes from the year 1995. 
Source: OECD Revenue Statistics, own computations. 
 
While the results of these business surveys indicate that profit shifting actually takes place in 
the European Union, empirical evidence is rather scarce. Most studies concern the US, but 
since multinationals typically do not reveal much about their intra-firm commerce, e.g. trade 
prices, these studies can only give indirect evidence for profit shifting3. Hines and Rice (1994) 
are one prominent example: They find a negative correlation between host country average 
tax rates and reported profits of US-Corporations in these countries. Another example is the 
work of Grubert and Slemrod (1998). They simultaneously examine the effect of taxes on real 
investment and profit shifting and find that profit shifting advantages are the predominant 
reason for US-investment in Puerto Rico. 
 
To my knowledge, there exists only one empirical study dealing with profit shifting in the 
European Union and this study is limited to the banking sector. Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga 
(2001) regress the taxes paid by domestic and foreign owned banks (as a percentage of assets) 
on changes in the statutory tax rate and find significant differences. While a rise in the 
statutory tax rate results in increasing tax payments by domestic owned banks, tax payments 
by foreign banks do not only increase less, but do in fact decrease. They explain their results 
with the possibility that foreign owned banks can reduce reported profits, and hence tax 
                                                 
3 One exception is the analysis of Clausing (2001). Using data on external trade prices as well as intra-firm trade 
prices of US multinationals, her study gives us direct evidence that cross-border intra-firm trade prices are likely 
influenced by the profit-shifting strategies of multinational firms. 
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payments relative to a constant stock of assets, just by shifting a part of these profits out of the 
country.  
 
Other studies, primarily focusing on the determinants of multinationals´ location of 
production, rather than on profit shifting, find a significant correlation between effective tax 
rates and location decisions4. Like others, Devereux and Griffith (1998) further control for the 
possibility of profit shifting by using the statutory tax rate as an additional variable in their 
model, but they do not find any significant correlation between investment and statutory tax 
rates. This unsatisfactory result may stem from the fact that for some of the firms in the 
dataset profit shifting is less relevant while it is more relevant for other firms. To obtain better 
results, it therefore seems promising to divide the data set used in the econometric analysis in 
several subsets of firms which differ from each other in important structural characteristics.                      
 
This is the approach taken in the present paper. In the theoretical part of this paper we argue 
that investment in firms that face lower transaction costs when shifting profits is relatively 
more sensitive to statutory tax rates than to effective tax rates. On the other hand, if firms face 
high costs when shifting income, they are relatively insensitive to the statutory tax rate. We 
test this theory in the econometric part of the paper with data on German multinationals´ FDI. 
Therefore we divide the data on FDI into two subsets. The criterion for allocation to the 
groups is the economic function of FDI such as production, finance or research and 
development which we associate with different opportunities (and hence costs) for profit 
shifting. We do not only employ two different measures of taxation in the empirical analysis, 
but, by using public inputs as an independent variable, we also follow the idea of Wildasin 
(1986) and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) who explicitly consider this variable in their 
theoretical models on tax competition. Our econometric results show that FDI associated with 
little opportunities for profit shifting (production) is correlated to effective tax rates and 
public inputs while FDI that we associated with more opportunities for profit shifting (service, 
finance, R&D) is correlated with the statutory tax rate instead. 
 
A simple and intuitive model of profit shifting and location decisions is provided in Section II 
of this paper. In Section III, we take a closer look at the sources and definitions of the 
variables used in the econometric analysis. Section IV gives an overview of the econometric 
approach and presents the empirical results. Section V concludes. 
                                                 
4 See Hines (1999) for an overview of these studies. 
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II. Theoretical background 
 
Optimal behaviour of multinationals without profit shifting 
Let us consider a multinational firm operating in two countries H and F where H is the home 
country and F is a foreign location5. We further assume that the home country is a high tax 
country and the foreign location is a low tax country. We have two factors of production, 
capital k and public inputs g. Capital is the only variable factor of production and gross profits 
in each country i are given by the value of production f(ki,gi) less the cost of capital r*ki. Total 
value of production is increasing in both ki and gi while it is marginally decreasing in ki and 
gi, so that 0≥kf ; 0≥gf ; 0≤kkf ; 0≤ggf . 
 
The gross profits defined above are subject to corporate taxation. Here we have to take into 
account that taxable profits are not the same as gross profits. Dependent on the tax code of a 
country some or all firms can claim special tax breaks, accelerated deduction et cetera, such 
that, in practice, the corporate tax rate τi, is applied on a tax base that is only a fraction of 
gross profits. Net profits are then given by 
  
])([),( , iiiiiiiiii krgkfkrgkf υετπ −⋅⋅−⋅−⋅−=  
 
where υi is a general exemption of profits from taxation and εi is a positive parameter 
describing the deductibility of investment costs. To simplify notation, we define  
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),(
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iiiii
i
gkf
krgkf νεγ −⋅⋅−= , 
 
where the parameter γi describes the fraction of production (instead of profits) that is taxed. It 
can vary between zero and one, such that with γi=0 production is completely exempted from 
taxation while the total value of production is taxed if γi=1. We call the product γi*τi=Ti the 
effective tax rate6 and rewrite net profits as 
 
 iiiii krgkf ⋅−⋅Τ−= )()1( ,π          (1) 
                                                 
5 The theoretical analysis is adapted from Haufler and Schjelderup (1999, 2000). 
6 For our simple analysis, we assume that γi is independent from ki.   
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We further assume that all foreign profits are exempted from taxation in the home country7, 
such that total profits of the multinational are given by 
 
)()(*)1()()1( ,, HFHHHFFF kkrgkfTgkfT +⋅−−+⋅−=Π       (2) 
 
Maximizing (2) with respect to the optimal level of capital in each country, we are left with 
the following first-order conditions: 
 
0),()1( =−⋅− rgkfT FFkF          (3a) 
0),()1( =−⋅− rgkfT HHkH          (3b) 
 
Conditions (3a) and (3b) can be easily interpreted: Capital in country F is invested up to the 
point where the marginal after tax profit generated by of one unit of capital is the same in both 
countries, which is equal to the cost of capital r.  
 
 
Optimal behaviour of multinationals under profit shifting 
We now introduce the possibility to shift profits from the parent company located in the high 
tax country H to a subsidiary located in the low tax country F. We denote by Q profits that 
can be transferred between the two establishments of the multinational by manipulating 
internal trade prices for final and intermediate goods, interest rates and royalties. This strategy 
generates (non deductible) costs of Fj kQ /2⋅= θω  since there are additional efforts that need to 
be taken in order to conceal the transfer pricing activity from tax authorities. We include Q2 in 
the cost function since it is suitable to assume convex concealment costs in Q. On the other 
hand, including kF in the denominator of the cost function takes into account the fact that 
concealment is less costly the more capital is employed in a country and makes the decisions 
of real investment and profit shifting interdependent. The last parameter determining ω is θj. 
θj is a firm specific positive parameter which can vary between a minimum value minjθ  and 
infinity8. If, for instance, profits are shifted from one location to the other by manipulating 
                                                 
7 Things are getting trickier if we assume a tax credit regime in the home country. In the simplest case where all 
foreign profits are repatriated to the home country, total profits are given by equation (2) only if TF>TH and 
)()](),([)1( , FHHHFFH kkrgkfgkf +⋅−+⋅Τ−=Π  else. If all profits are reinvested in the foreign location, equation 
(2) holds in any case. If only a part of foreign profits is repatriated to the home country, total profits are given by 
a weighted combination of the different equations.   
8 The minimum value of θj ensures that profit shifting is limited in any case.  
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internal transfer prices, shifting costs can differ with respect to the goods traded. A firm that 
provides its parent with overhead services which are not commonly traded on the free market 
will face lower concealment costs than a firm that trades intermediate or final goods and is 
more restricted by the arms-length principle of transfer pricing. So, θj is expected to be lower 
for the former type of firms, while it is expected to be higher for the latter ones, e.g. firms that 
produce more tradable goods. 
 
With the possibility of profit shifting, total after tax profits of the multinational are given by 
   
ωγτ
γτ
−⋅−−⋅−
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ωττ −⋅−++⋅−⋅−+⋅−= QkkrgkfTgkfgkfTgkf FHHFHHHHHFFFFF )()()(),()(),( ,,   (4) 
 
In this case the multinational can not only decide about kF and kH but also about the amount of 
profit shifted from H to F. Differentiating equation (4) with respect to Q gives us the optimal 
level of profit shifting, that is 
  
j
FFH kQ θ
ττ
2
)(~ ⋅−=           (5) 
 
From (5) it is straightforward to see that, with a lower corporate tax rate τF, incentives for 
profit shifting increase. Substituting (5) in (4) and differentiating with respect to kF and kH, we 
get the first-order conditions under a strategy including profit shifting:  
 
0
4
)(),()1(
2
=−+−⋅−
j
FH
FFkF rgkfT θ
ττ         (6a) 
0),()1( =−⋅− rgkfT HHkH          (6b) 
 
Comparing (3) with (6), it becomes obvious that investment is distorted by the term 
jFH θττ 4/)( 2−  towards country F if profit shifting into this country is possible. This distortion 
becomes larger as the difference in corporate tax rates between the two countries grows and 
decreases with higher transfer costs θj.  
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Since 0),()1( ≥⋅− HHkH gkfT , the term ]4/)[( 2 jFHr θττ −−  has to be positive to fulfil condition 
(6a). However, this is the case only as long as the marginal cost of capital (the world interest 
rate r) is higher than the marginal gain from profit shifting9. To ensure this and to close our 
model, the minimum level of θj has to be )]4/()[( 2min rFHj ⋅−= ττθ .  
 
 
Predominant factor for multinationals’ location decision under profit shifting 
In a next step, we want to show that the decision to invest in country F crucially depends on 
the transfer costs θj. For this purpose we use a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form 
αα −⋅= 1),( ii gkgkf ii , but the results derived below do not change qualitatively if we use a more 
general kind of production function such as CES. Concentrating our analysis on the foreign 
country we take all other variables as given, but note that we assume positive profits in 
country H that can be shifted to country F. Using the Cobb-Douglas production function 
defined above, we can solve equation (6a) for kF: 
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As we can see from (7), investment in country F is a function of three different country 
specific variables: the foreign effective as well as the statutory tax rate and the level of public 
inputs offered by the foreign country. Partially differentiating the investment function with 
respect to these variables, we get the following elasticities: 
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9 If this were not the case the level of investment in country F would be infinite.   
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These equations reveal three facts: First, while the investment elasticity with respect to the tax 
rates (8a) and (8c) is negative, it is positive with respect to the public input (8b), implying that 
higher taxation lowers investment in country F while public inputs encourage investment. 
Second and more important, while (8a) and (8b) are completely independent from the 
transaction cost parameter θi, this is not the case for the investment elasticity with respect to 
the statutory tax rate10. Third, equation (8c) describes a concave function in θj, such that 
)( jθητ  converges against infinity for θj → minjθ  and against zero for θj → ∞.  
 
Figure 1 
Transfer costs and dominating economic activity 
 
 
As shown by Figure 1, it therefore exists a point of intersection between )( jθητ  and either Tη  
or gη  at jθ~. While the statutory tax rate is predominant for investment decisions as long as the 
                                                 
10 Intuitively Tη  and gη  are independent from θj because θj is only indirectly linked with TF and gF. A change in 
θj results not only in a change in the level of kF, i.e. lowering θj  leads to a higher level of investment in country 
F, but it proportionally changes FF Tk ∂∂  and FF gk ∂∂ . Since these two effects offset each other, Tη  and gη  
are independent from θj. 
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firm specific transaction costs are lower than jθ~ , the effective tax rate and public inputs are 
predominant if θj is higher than jθ~ .      
  
This result is quite intuitive, since total net profits in country F come from two different 
sources. One of them is real economic activity, affected by ),()1( FFkF gkfT ⋅− , the other source 
is tax savings through profit shifting, affected by jFH θττ 4/)( 2− . For low transaction costs, the 
proportion of tax savings that stem from profits generated in country H rises and hence the 
statutory tax rate becomes more important in determining the optimal level of investment. 
Consequently, profit shifting is the driving force inducing investments in country F for θj < jθ~  
and real economic activity is the predominating determinant of investment as long as θj > jθ~ . 
In the extreme case where θj is equal to infinity, such that profit shifting is prohibited and real 
activity is the only source of income, investment does only depend on the effective tax rate 
and the level of public inputs. On the other extreme, if transaction costs are low and most 
profits stem from tax savings in country H, investment primarily depends on the statutory tax 
rate.    
 
What we have shown above is that the determinants of multinationals’ location decisions are 
influenced by the opportunities (or costs) of profit shifting. Without profit shifting, location 
decisions are only influenced by the effective tax rate and local inputs, e.g. public inputs. On 
the other extreme, if there are no costs for profit shifting and the only reason for establishing a 
firm is tax arbitrage rather than real economic activity, the parameter determining investment 
decisions is the nominal tax rate τi. Between these two extremes, all three parameters 
influence investment decisions but with higher values of θj, and hence less profit shifting, the 
influence of effective taxes and local inputs grows, while the influence of nominal taxes 
declines. 
 
In the econometric part of this paper we test the theoretical results derived here. If we can find 
support for a positive relationship between corporate tax rates and investment decisions rather 
than between effective tax rates or public inputs and investment we have (indirect) evidence 
for profit shifting. 
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III. Data Sources and description 
            
Data on German multinationals´ foreign investment decisions 
We now want to test empirically the results of our model with a sample describing the foreign 
activities of German multinationals. Data on the foreign activities of German multinational 
corporations are taken from the RWI-Database “Globalisation” and act as dependent variable 
in our econometric analysis. The RWI-Database on the globalization of German companies is 
based on annual reports the enterprises provide for the public and is in some cases 
supplemented by other sources such as newspapers, internet pages and so on. The panel 
covers activities of approximately one hundred firms which are responsible for a large 
proportion of German outward FDI11.       
 
Built on these annual reports a panel-like dataset of time series for individual companies is 
constructed12. Among other statistics, this panel provides us with data about foreign activities 
of the companies investigated. Examples of such activities are the acquisition of a foreign 
company, the foundation of a new company abroad or the start of a joint venture. 
Additionally, for all these activities the economic function of the foreign affiliate is provided, 
e.g. whether it is intended to produce final or intermediate goods or whether it is intended to 
provide its parent company with overhead services, such as finance or research and 
development.   
 
From these data we can get count numbers of German multinationals´ foreign activities, 
separated by year, host country and economic function13. Sufficient data is available for the 
years 1991-1998 and eight European host countries, Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom, leaving us with 64 different counts. As 
shown in Figure 2, almost half of these activities took place in France and the UK, while the 
share of activities in the small countries Belgium and Ireland is rather small. The count data is 
separated into two groups by the economic function of the activity. Figure 3 describes the
                                                 
11 The database indirectly covers almost one seventh of FDI stocks under review by the Deutsche Bundesbank 
for the balance of payments statistics. When consider employees working abroad, the representativity is even 
higher: more than 40% of employees at affiliates of German companies abroad are working in firms included in 
the database. 
12 A detailed description of the database is given by Döhrn (2001) or Döhrn and Radmacher-Nottelmann (2000). 
13  Of course, it would be interesting to look at more disaggregated data, e.g. the count number of engagements 
in each year and country, where the economic function is production given that the engagement is the foundation 
of a new firm abroad or a joint venture etc. We focus on the economic function, independent of the form of 
activity taking place since data on this most disaggregated and basic level is very scarce.  
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Figure 2 
Share of German multinationals´ foreign activities, 1991-1998 
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Source: RWI-Database Globalization, own calculations. 
  
composition of the two groups: On the one hand we have a group including activities within 
the functional area of management and finance, research and development and overhead 
services, on the other hand we have a group consisting of engagements which are only 
undertaken in purpose of production. 
 
Figure 3 
Composition of FDI subsets 
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The number of activities in each group is roughly the same, 189 of 322 activities observed 
between 1991 and 1998 being acquisitions of a foreign company, the foundation of a new 
company or the start of a joint venture with the intention to produce abroad. However, the 
relative size of the two groups varies in the course of time. Figure 4 gives us a picture of this 
development: although investments in the two groups seem to behave similar at first glance, 
there are some differences. For example, while the number of activities in the first group 
(finance, service and R&D) decreased in the years from 1991 to 1993 and increased from 
1996 to 1997, the development for the second group (production) was the opposite during this 
time periods. 
 
The fundamental idea of this paper is that these two groups differ from each other in the 
degree profits can be shifted between countries14 and that the determinants of FDI decisions 
between the two groups therefore differ, too. In the following we test whether we can find 
significant differences in the determinants of FDI decisions between the two groups. 
 
Figure 4 
German multinationals´ foreign activities by economic function, 1991-1998 
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Source: RWI-Database Globalization, own calculations. 
                                                 
14 Genschel (2001) expects the costs for profit shifting into firms located in the second group (production) to be 
much higher than that for the first group. 
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Data on tax rates 
There are two different measures of corporate taxation used in the analysis. One is the 
effective tax rate Ti, which is a function of the corporate tax rate and the tax base. It measures 
the tax burden of investment by dividing taxes paid by pre-tax profits. Without the possibility 
of profit shifting, and using the notation of our model in section II [see equation (1)], the 
effective tax rate is equal to 
  
 
iii
i
iii
krgkf
T ⋅−−=⋅= ),(1
πγτ         (9) 
 
The measures used here are taken from Büttner (2002) and were also employed in Stöwhase 
(2002). Using a sample of approximately six thousand companies, individual effective tax 
rates are computed for each company using equation (9). In a second step, the effective tax 
rate for each country is derived by using the median tax rate paid by its corporations. Since 
profit shifting in multinational corporations may reduce the effective tax for these firms, we 
exclude multinational corporations from the sample tax rates are derived from15. 
  
Moreover, as pointed out in the theoretical part of this paper, the statutory tax rate may have 
to be taken into account if substantial intercompany transfers open possibilities for reducing 
the overall tax burden. Table 2 presents figures for both tax rates. While the statutory tax rate 
is very stable over time (most of the variance comes from the implementation or abolishment 
of several surtaxes), there is a relatively high variance in the effective tax rates. Also, 
effective tax rates are in any case lower than statutory tax rates. This is consistent with our 
model where the upper bound of γi is unity and hence iiii ττγ ≤⋅=Τ . Italy and Ireland are 
exceptions; in these countries the effective tax rate is higher than the nominal tax rate. While 
there is no simple explanation for Italy, the case of Ireland is very clear: effective tax rates are 
computed from local firms which face the regular Irish corporate tax rate which is around 
35%. Consequently effective tax rates based on this normal corporate rate are much higher 
than the reduced rate of 10%. We can not use the regular tax rate, however, since the 
multinational firms under consideration face only the reduced rate. We take account of this 
                                                 
15 Nevertheless, tax rates can be biased by other forms of profit shifting such as shifting between corporate and 
personal income. This possibility is recently under discussion in the context of the Nordic Dual income tax (see 
Lindhe, Södersten and Öberg (2002)). Empirical evidence for profit shifting between corporate and personal 
income comes from Gordon and Slemrod (2000). They found that a substantial amount of income was shifted 
from corporate to personal income in the United States since 1965 by changing the form of compensation for 
executives and other workers. We will abstract from this problem and assume that the effective tax rates are not 
significantly distorted by profit shifting activities. 
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problem in the empirical analysis by excluding these countries from our sample used in the 
robustness check.      
 
Table 2 
Statutory and effective rates of corporate taxation* 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
statutory 30.00 30.00 30.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 
Austria 
effective 22.90 13.90 14.90 10.60 10.90 16.80 25.50 10.30 
statutory 39.00 39.00 40.17 40.17 40.17 40.17 40.17 40.17 
Belgium 
effective 15.70 17.70 22.70 22.30 23.90 23.40 22.00 20.60 
statutory 34.00 34.00 33.33 33.33 36.66 36.66 36.66 41.66 
France 
effective 32.40 32.50 32.10 32.40 34.80 33.90 37.10 36.10 
statutory 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Ireland** 
effective 16.40 13.60 13.60 14.30 14.40 16.80 20.20 23.50 
statutory 36.00 36.00 36.00 36.00 36.00 37.00 37.00 37.00 
Italy 
effective 41.10 47.00 50.70 44.40 45.80 45.30 44.10 43.90 
statutory 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 
Netherlands 
effective 32.10 32.50 31.40 31.10 30.60 31.70 30.10 31.00 
statutory 35.50 35.50 35.50 35.50 35.34 35.31 35.27 35.26 
Spain 
effective 27.90 28.80 26.80 24.60 24.20 26.40 26.00 27.70 
statutory 33.00 33.00 33.00 33.00 33.00 33.00 33.00 33.00 
UK 
effective 31.70 31.40 30.70 31.40 31.10 30.10 29.70 28.90 
 
Source: Büttner (2002). 
* Statutory tax rates include additional surtaxes. 
** Ireland has a reduced rate of 10% for international investments. The tax rate for local firms was 40% in 1991 
and decreased to 36% in 1998.    
 
 
Data on other explanatory variables 
Beside the two measures of taxation, we are most interested in a measure of public inputs gi. 
Unfortunately detailed data on different kinds of public inputs such as public infrastructure 
investments are not available for the whole dataset. Instead we have to take a more general 
indicator for services provided by the government: government consumption expenditures. 
Statistics about government consumption expenditures are taken from the National Accounts 
statistics of the OECD and can be split into two different parts, government individual and 
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government collective consumption. Since the latter one includes expenditures for general 
administration, costs that play at least no role in determining the level of public infrastructure, 
we use government individual consumption as proxy for public inputs. These expenditures, 
expressed in terms of national currency and at 1995 prices, are normalized by GDP in order to 
make countries comparable.  
 
Despite the importance of taxation and public inputs, these variables alone can hardly explain 
all of the distribution of foreign direct investment. Additional variables used in the 
econometric analysis are GDP and labour costs. GDP, which also comes from the OECD 
National accounts, serves as proxy for market size. Market size itself is associated with lower 
transport costs and hence is an important source of locational advantages. Markusen (1995) 
points out that locational advantages appear when transport costs are high, the foreign market 
is sizeable and factor prices are low relative to other locations. It would be promising, 
therefore, to include German exports in the econometric analysis16, but GDP and exports are 
in fact strongly correlated with each other. Finally, labour costs are included to control for 
country differences in factor costs17.       
 
 
 
IV. Econometric approach and empirical results 
 
Econometric approach 
For count data, like the number of engagements used in our analysis, the Poisson distribution 
is very useful since it describes phenomena with non-negative integer outcomes where zero is 
a frequent observation. So, the number of engagements n is modelled as a Poisson distributed 
random variable. The likelihood of observing a count of engagements in country i in year t is 
 
!)exp()( ,,,,, ti
ti
tititi n
nnf λλ ⋅−=         (10) 
 
with titinE ,, )( λ=  
 
                                                 
16 A close link between German exports and FDI was observed in an empirical study of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank (1997). Using German Exports instead of host countries GDP as independent variable in the 
regression, does not change the results reported below.  
17 A detailed description on the source and properties of the labour costs variable is given in Stöwhase (2002).  
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The corresponding link-function for the Poisson distribution is the log-link )log( ,tiλ , which 
ensures that the dependent variable in our model can not become negative. Now, the 
expectation λi,t can be written as the product of a linear equation 
 
)exp( ,, titi X⋅= βλ           (11) 
 
where Xi,t is a vector of observable country and time specific exogenous variables that 
determine the number of engagements and β is a parameter vector to be estimated using 
generalised least squares18. With tax rates, public inputs, GDP and labour costs as exogenous 
variables, our baseline regression can be written as:  
     
)exp( ,,5,4,3,21, , titititititti wyßgtii εββτββααλ +⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+Τ⋅++=    (12) 
 
where αi is a dummy that covers country specific effects, αt is a dummy that controls for 
exogenous shocks in time, yi,t represents host countries GDP in year t, wi,t denotes labour costs 
and εi,t is the error term. 
 
The parameter βi estimated from regression (12) then gives us the ceteris paribus change in 
the expected number of engagements in a country, if the related parameter variable alters. 
Note that this is just a mean value. What we do in our regression is the following: first, we 
estimate the expected (mean) number of engagements in each country for the given economic 
conditions. In a second step, we estimate the change of this expected number.  
 
 
Results for the baseline regression 
Table 3 shows the econometric results based on regression (12). Column (1) presents the 
results for the activities undertaken in order to produce abroad: While the statutory tax rate 
seems to have no significant influence on the dependent variable, the opposite holds for the 
effective tax rate. The parameter for Ti has the expected negative sign and is significant at the 
five percent level. The other variable of interest is government individual expenditure. As 
predicted by theory, the influence of government individual consumption as a measure for
                                                 
18 It follows from 
titi X ,, )log( ∗= βλ  that )exp( ,, titi X∗= βλ . 
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public inputs is positive and also significant. As indicated by the positive parameter for GDP, 
market potentials may also play a major role in determining investment decisions. This result 
is very plausible and comes indeed from the fact that locational advantages appear when 
production takes place in a big country and transport costs disappear. 
 
Table 3 
Baseline Regression 
 Production Service, Finance, R&D 
Pooled 
Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Effective tax rate, 
Ti 
-1.987** 
(-2.048) 
-1.819* 
(-1.949)
 
0.394 
(0.542) 
0.268 
(0.387)  
-0.442 
(-0.829) 
Statutory tax rate, 
τi 
2.139 
(0.911) 
 
1.144 
(0.506) 
-7.016**
(-2.467)  
-6.972** 
(-2.435) 
-1.994 
(-1.123) 
Public inputs,  
gi 
5.513* 
(1.759) 
6.189** 
(2.018) 
5.749* 
(1.801) 
4.265 
(1.152) 
2.359 
(0.679) 
4.479 
(1.224) 
4.570* 
(1,943) 
GDP,  
yi 
6.759** 
(1.973) 
6.334* 
(1.847) 
7.208** 
(2.056) 
-4.399 
(-1.246)
-2.572 
(-0.786)
-4.385 
(-1.237) 
1.176 
(0.494) 
Labour costs,  
wi 
 
-0.767 
(-0.689) 
-0.682 
(-0.615)
-0.798 
(-0.729)
-0.151 
(-0.132)
-0.874 
(-0.783)
-0.260 
(-0.230) 
-0.729 
(-0.933) 
R-Squared 0.77 0.77 0.75 0.70 0.66 0.70 0.83 
Adj. R-Squared 0.67 0.67 0.64 0.56 0.51 0.57 0.76 
Observations 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 
 
z-statistics are given in brackets; * and ** indicates significance at the level of 10%, and 5%. 
All variables expressed in logarithmic values. 
Coefficients for time and country dummies not shown.  
 
Completely different results appear, however, when we look at activities in the context of 
overhead services, financing and R&D, shown in column (4). In contrast to the first group, the 
only variable that significantly influences the location decision is the statutory tax rate. 
Variation in the dependent variable can not be explained by effective taxes, public inputs and 
the GDP. Labour costs are insignificant in all cases and for both groups. 
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When we compare the outcome of the baseline regression with our theoretical results, it 
becomes obvious, that the determinants of multinational activities in the two groups are close 
to the extreme cases described in section II. The results for the first group, consisting of 
activities undertaken in purpose of production, fit very well to the case where the transaction 
cost parameter θj is relatively high and profit shifting is almost prohibitive so that locational 
advantages such as effective taxation and public inputs are important determinants of profits. 
On the other hand, empirical results for the latter group are consistent with the assumption 
that firms in this group face relatively low costs when shifting profits and hence real activity 
plays only a small role in determining investment decisions. As real activity plays only a 
small role, it is not surprising that public input and market size parameters are insignificant 
since these parameters do not directly influence the decision on profit shifting. These results 
imply that most of the firms providing overhead services, financial intermediation or 
undertaking research and development for its German parent company are located 
strategically in order to reduce the overhead tax burden of the multinational by shifting 
profits.  
 
Our results therefore give us indirect evidence of profit shifting. Furthermore, the analysis 
shows us that shifting is limited to the kind of firms that face lower transaction costs and are 
more independent from location specific factors of production such as public inputs. Since we 
have expressed all our variables in logarithmic terms, the observed regression parameters 
shown in Table 2 can be interpreted as elasticities. Thus, a one percent decrease in the 
effective tax rate of a country is expected to stimulate the number of engagements undertaken 
in purpose of production in this country by about two percent. This confirms previous 
empirical work where the elasticity of FDI with respect to the effective tax rate typically 
fluctuates in a range between -2 and -419. On the other hand, a one percentage increase in the 
statutory tax rate diminishes engagements in firms providing its parent with overhead services 
or undertaking research by approximately seven percent.      
 
Column (7) presents empirical results for a pooled sample where we do not distinguish 
between the two different groups. Here, the effects observed using disaggregated data 
completely disappear. The only variable that significantly influences investment decision is 
                                                 
19 De Mooij and Ederveen (2001) make the outcomes of several empirical studies comparable and compute a 
mean tax-elasticity around -3.3, i.e., a one percentage point increase in the host countries tax rate leads to a 3.3 
percent reduction of foreign direct investment. This mean value is calculated from studies that typically report 
elasticities between -2 and -4. Moreover, the elasticity derived here is also very close to that reported for bilateral 
foreign direct investment in the manufacturing sector by Stöwhase (2002). 
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the level of public inputs. Although they have the expected sign, all other variables are 
insignificant. It is not surprising that we get such insignificant results when pooling the data, 
since investments are underdone for different purposes, and therefore have completely 
different determinants. As a consequence, the econometric model can not carve out clear 
results.  
 
Note that investments in the first group (production) often employ more capital than 
investments in the second group (investments in R&D facilities are sometimes an exception). 
The total sum of capital invested in the first group is therefore much higher than that invested 
in the second group. Using the amount of capital rather than count numbers in our regression, 
the results for the pooled sample would be more similar to that of the first group since the 
weight of this group measured in terms of capital is relatively high. We would get results very 
similar to that of Devereux and Griffith (1998): the effective tax rate would be significant; the 
statutory tax rate would be insignificant in determining investment decisions. This 
demonstrates the importance of using data disaggregated by the type of FDI for econometric 
analysis on the effect of taxes. 
 
 In the remaining columns of Table 3 we tested whether the simultaneous use of the two tax 
measures in one regression biases our results. Since Τi is a function of γi and τi, there is a high 
possibility that the effective tax rate is not exogenous, but endogenously given by the nominal 
tax rate. Although observed correlation between the two variables is almost negligible in our 
sample, we tested for this possibility. Therefore we ran two additional regressions for each 
group, excluding one measure of taxation in each. As we can see from columns (2) to (3) and 
(5) to (6) respectively, results do not change much, neither in the size of the regression 
parameters nor in its level of significance20.  
 
 
Robustness Test 
We have mentioned above that effective taxation in Ireland and Italy is higher than the 
statutory tax rate and that the results derived from the baseline regression could be biased by 
the use of the reduced tax rate for multinational corporations in Ireland. Hence, we excluded 
Ireland and Italy from the sample. Results of this regression are presented in Table 4. Even 
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after exclusion of the two countries the results appear to be quite robust. When we take a 
closer look at our findings, however, we get one striking result: while the importance of the 
effective tax rate in the first group grows after exclusion (the coefficient changes by 
approximately 30 percent and becomes more significant), the importance of the statutory tax 
rate for activities in the second group declines (in this case the coefficient decreases by 
approximately 20 percent and simultaneously loses significance). 
 
Table 4 
Exclusion of Ireland and Italy 
 Production Service, Finance, R&D 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Effective tax rate, 
Ti 
-2.643** 
(-2.478) 
-2.478** 
(-2.405) 
 
0.765 
(1.005) 
0.612 
(0.835) 
 
Statutory tax rate, 
τi 
2.696 
(0.999) 
 
1.514 
(0.592) 
-5.497* 
(-1.796) 
 
-5.272** 
(-2.435) 
Public inputs,  
gi 
8.155** 
(2.042) 
9.505** 
(2.506) 
7.799* 
(1.904) 
0.019 
(0.004) 
-1.484 
(-0.347) 
0.902 
(0.204) 
GDP,  
yi 
7.855** 
(2.063) 
7.606** 
(1.970) 
7.934** 
(2.023) 
-3.497 
(-0.935) 
-2.508 
(-0.711) 
-3.343 
(-0.891) 
Labour costs,  
wi 
 
-0.966 
(-0.924) 
-0.919 
(-0.872) 
-1.127 
(-1.096) 
-0.051 
(-0.042) 
-0.676 
(-0.576) 
-0.291 
(-0.241) 
R-Squared 0.83 0.83 0.78 0.72 0.69 0.71 
Adj. R-Squared 0.73 0.73 0.66 0.54 0.52 0.55 
Observations 48 48 48 48 48 48 
 
z-statistics are given in brackets; * and ** indicates significance at the level of 10%, and 5%. 
All variables expressed in logarithmic values. 
Coefficients for time and country dummies not shown.  
 
One explanation for observed changes in the first group could be the fact that the effective tax 
rates for Ireland and Italy used in the econometric analysis are too “high”. Tax induced 
                                                                                                                                                        
20 Indeed, some parameters drop from the 5 percent level to the 10 percent level of significance while others 
advance. As indicated by the small changes in the z-statistics, these variations are not very high. Discrete jumps 
in the level of significance come from the fact that z-values are distributed near to the 5 percent level.  
 22
investments in these countries are not treated as tax induced and hence underestimated by the 
model. To give an example: a multinational enterprise locating a subsidiary in Ireland de facto 
faces an effective tax rate lower than or equal to 10 percent21. Because of this low tax rate the 
multinational decides to locate in Ireland. Our econometric model, however, suggest that this 
location decision is based on an effective tax rate that is around 15 or 20 percent and hence is 
not tax induced. Consequently, the observed tax sensitivity of investment grows after 
exclusion of the two countries.  
 
When we think of Ireland as a tax haven, changes in the second group can also be explained. 
With its preferential corporate tax rate of 10 percent, Ireland can be considered as an outlier in 
our sample as the next lowest tax rate is 30 percent (Austria from 1991-1993). Our results in 
the baseline regression are then to some degree influenced by the existing preferential taxation 
offered by the Irish government and primarily applied to multinationals´ subsidiaries engaged 
in financial investments22. As expected, the tax sensitivity of investment in the second group 
declines after adjusting our sample. 
 
Other variations of our model, such as the exclusion of the labour cost variable, which is 
insignificant in all cases, or the limitation to specific time periods, do not lead to major 
changes for our findings reported above. This suggests that the results derived from our 
database are robust with respect to the exact specification of the model. 
 
 
V. Summary and conclusion 
 
This paper has analysed count data about foreign engagements of German multinationals 
differentiated by their economic function, in order to investigate if there is substantial 
variation in the determinants of FDI between these functional groups. Results indicate that 
foreign engagements in real activity depend on variables that refer to locational advantages, 
e.g. GDP, public inputs or the effective tax rate, measuring the actual rather than the statutory 
burden of taxation. Completely different outcomes appear when we look at engagements in 
the functional area of management and finance, research and development or overhead 
services which we associate with high potentials for (respectively low costs of) profit shifting. 
                                                 
21 The statutory tax rate of 10 percent multiplied with a factor 1≤iγ . 
22 Because most of these subsidiaries, which are part of the second group in our regression, are located in a small 
area near the docks in Dublin, they are often referred to as the Dublin docks companies. 
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Instead of locational advantages, investments in these groups only follow the statutory tax 
rate, showing us indirect evidence for profit shifting activities. The effect of the statutory tax 
rate is thereby approximately three times higher than that of the effective tax rate on 
investments in real activity. Unfortunately we can not distinguish whether this is due to 
differences in capital mobility between the two groups, or to differences in the ratio of capital 
employed per count of activity.    
 
As we have seen in the analysis, higher effective tax rates for investments undertaken for 
purpose of real activity (production) can be balanced out by other location factors such as 
public inputs. Consequently, from this point of view, there is little possibility for a “race to 
the bottom” in effective corporate tax rates across Europe, as feared by many scholars. On the 
other hand, profit shifting can indeed result in a “race to the bottom” since a country can 
easily gain corporate tax revenues by lowering the statutory tax rate, leaving the effective 
level of taxation constant. 
 
The main result of our analysis is that the separation of different types of FDI leads to very 
sharp results on the effects that different parts of the corporate tax system have on different 
types of FDI. Using aggregated data instead, as has been done by most empirical studies of 
the subject, gives a less clear-cut picture of the correlation between tax parameters and 
investment, since it “averages” over different, and sometimes even opposite effects. Provided 
the availability of suitable data, further research should therefore concentrate on the effects of 
taxation on specific types of FDI.       
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